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Battle of Fazilka

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Battle of Fazilka
Part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Infantry units from the Pakistan Army with an M48A1 Patton advance
Date3 December – 17 December 1971
Location
Fazilka, Punjab India-Pakistan Border
Result Pakistani victory[1]
Belligerents
 India  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders

India Brig. S.S. Chowdhry
India Brig. G.S. Reen

India Brig. Piara Singh [2]
Pakistan Brig. Amir Hamza
Units involved

 Indian Army

  • 67 Brigade

 Pakistan Army

  • 105 Brigade
Casualties and losses
  • 190 killed
  • 196 missing
  • 425 wounded
  • Unknown

    The Battle of Fazilka was a military engagement during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in the western sector, near the Indo-Pakistani border. The battle saw Pakistani forces achieve success against the Indian 67 Brigade, capturing significant territory west of Fazilka.[3][1]

    Background

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    The proximity of the Sulaimanke Headworks to the international border made it imperative for Pakistan to take offensive action from the outset. Any territorial gains would not only threaten nearby Fazilka but also provide a solid base for Pakistan’s planned main offensive toward Indian Punjab.[4]

    Pakistan's II Corps was assigned to launch a major counteroffensive in the west to relieve pressure on East Pakistan. The offensive was intended to exploit Indian weaknesses by attacking from Bahawalnagar towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana. The plan was finalized in September 1971, with elements of 105 and 25 Brigades expected to lead the charge, supported by pre-positioned Pakistan Air Force assets.[5]

    However, Major General Ghulam Umar, then Secretary of the National Security Council, later criticized this strategy, calling it a "bogus theory," arguing that the idea of defending East Pakistan through an offensive in the west was flawed.[6]

    Battle

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    On the night of 3 December, the Pakistani 105 Independent Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Amir Hamza, launched a rapid and aggressive assault against the Indian 67 Infantry Brigade in the Sulaimanke sector. Under cover of intense artillery fire, the Pakistani troops charged through Indian defenses with such speed that they captured the tank obstacle line of the Sabuna Distributary—six miles inside Indian territory—within an hour.[7]

    The Indian forces, struck by "pandemonium and bewilderment,"[8] destroyed all but one of the 22 bridges on the distributary while retreating. This desperate move also prevented them from launching an effective counterattack.[9] Over the next few nights, Indian troops launched five counterattacks (on 3/4 Dec, 4/5 Dec, 5/6 Dec, 8/9 Dec, and 13/14 Dec), all of which failed due to intense and accurate Pakistani artillery shelling.[10] The ferocity of the Pakistani assault caused the Indian command to overestimate the Pakistani strength, believing they were facing two brigades instead of a single battalion supported by a depleted tank squadron.[11]

    Pakistani forces successfully captured the Bund ahead of the Sabuna Distributary, securing the strategic Sulaimanke Canal Headworks, which lay just 1,500 meters from the border.[12] The Indian 67 Brigade commander, Brigadier S.S. Chowdhry, was sacked on 11 December and replaced by Brigadier G.S. Reen, who was later replaced by Brigadier Piara Singh.[13] By this time, the Indian command had become so demoralized that Major General Ram Singh, Commander of "Foxtrot" Sector, noted that his troops were "discomposed and flustered, its men demoralized and put out."[14]

    The Pakistan Air Force played a supporting role, with No. 17 Squadron flying 55 sorties from Rafiqui Air Base. Of these, 33 were deemed successful, with claims of destroying half a dozen Indian tanks and several vehicles. However, 22 sorties failed to find targets or resulted in questionable accuracy.[15]

    On 14 December, orders were given for Pakistan’s II Corps to move into forward positions. However, Army Headquarters diverted 33 Division to reinforce other sectors, significantly weakening II Corps’ striking power. At 18:45 on 16 December, a sudden "freeze order" halted all troop movements, leaving the corps stranded on the Pakistani side of the border when the ceasefire took effect at 20:00 on 17 December.[16]

    Aftermath

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    Pakistan occupied a lot of agricultural land in Fazilka[1] but futher actions delay in launching the II Corps offensive has remained a subject of debate among military analysts. Some argue that confusion within Pakistan’s high command led to the failure to execute the attack, while others point to a lack of promised PAF support as a major factor.[17] According to one analysis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force withdrew promised air support just days before the operation was to begin.[11]

    Although major hostilities ended with the ceasefire, on 26–27 December, Indian 4 Para of 51 Para Brigade conducted an assault to dislodge a small Pakistani platoon from a sand dune near Nagi village. The attack resulted in 21 Indian casualties and 60 wounded.[18]

    References

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    1. ^ a b c "Memoirs of Sabuna Bund Battle Sulaimanki-Fazilka Sector 3-6 Dec 1971". Hilal Publications. Retrieved 2025-03-25.
    2. ^ Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War, Chapter IX, ‘The Punjab and Rajasthan Front,’ page 387.
    3. ^ Gill, John H. (2003). An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh. National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. p. 'Page'55.
    4. ^ Mansoor Shah, 256.
    5. ^ "The vanquished generals and the liberation war of Bangladesh - Mamoon, Muntassir: 9789844582101 - AbeBooks". www.abebooks.com. pp. Page=92. Retrieved 2025-03-25.
    6. ^ Lt. Gen. Candeth, 21, 28.
    7. ^ HRC Report, Part IV, Chapter VIII.
    8. ^ Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War, Chapter IX, ‘The Punjab and Rajasthan Front,’ page 386.
    9. ^ Lt. Col. Mukhtar Ahmad Gilani, "Lost Opportunity - A Military Analysis 1971," Defence Journal, January 2003.
    10. ^ Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War, Chapter IX, ‘The Punjab and Rajasthan Front,’ page 387.
    11. ^ a b Mitha, Aboobaker Osman (1994). Fallacies & Realities: An Analysis of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan's "Memoirs". Maktaba Fikr-o-Danish. pp. Page=66-67. ISBN 978-969-8130-09-1.
    12. ^ Jahan Dad Khan, 124.
    13. ^ Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War, Chapter IX, ‘The Punjab and Rajasthan Front,’ page 387.
    14. ^ Maj. J. N. Goel, "Defending Ganganagar," Sainik Samachar, 20 July 1986.
    15. ^ Maj. Agha Humayun Amin, "The Western Theatre in 1971: A Strategic and Operational Analysis," Defence Journal, February 2002.
    16. ^ Lt. Col. Mukhtar Ahmad Gilani, "Lost Opportunity - A Military Analysis 1971," Defence Journal, January 2003.
    17. ^ Maj. Agha Humayun Amin, "The Anatomy of Indo-Pak Wars A Strategic and Operational Analysis," Defence Journal, August 2001.
    18. ^ Lt. Col. J. N. Goel, "31 (1) Para Brigade Operations 1971," in Karim, 375-79.

    See also

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