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2025 Moldovan energy crisis

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The Cuciurgan power station, located in unrecognized Transnistria. It generated most of Moldova's electricity needs for decades, and ran historically on natural gas supplied by Russia to Transnistria for free.

On 31 December 2024, at 19:50 EET (17:50 UTC), Moldova's unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria stopped receiving natural gas supplies from Russia when Ukraine's gas transit deal with Russia expired. Historically, Transnistria had covered most of Moldova's electricity needs through the Cuciurgan power station, which functioned with Russian gas supplied to Transnistria for free. However, with the termination of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria and the end of Moldovan purchases of Transnistrian electricity, the possibility of a humanitarian crisis in Transnistria has arisen, which could potentially lead to the collapse of the breakaway state and its reintegration into Moldova. Three people have died in Transnistria since the start of the energy crisis due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Electricity prices have also risen significantly in Moldova.

Background

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Transnistria is an unrecognized breakaway state internationally recognized as part of Moldova. It is located mainly on the Moldovan left bank of the Dniester river. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Transnistria War of 1992 sparked between Moldova and the separatists in Transnistria. The latter won with the help of the Russian army present in the region, which is today organized into the Operational Group of Russian Forces,[1] comprising about 1,500 troops,[2] mostly local Transnistrians and a few dozen personnel from Russia.[1] A majority of Transnistrians speak Russian as their first language and around half of them have Russian citizenship along with the Moldovan one,[2] even though only 29.1% of the population declared Russian ethnicity in the 2015 census.[3] An internationally unrecognized referendum held in 2006 showed that over 95% of Transnistrians wanted to be annexed into Russia;[2] allegations on irregularities and infringements in the referendum exist.[4]

Moldova has relied since its independence on the Cuciurgan power station to satisfy most of its electricity needs. This power station is located in Transnistrian-held territory, and it ran on Russian natural gas supplied to Transnistria for free.[5] Moldova paid millions of euros to Transnistria every year in exchange of electricity at below-the-market prices, effectively financing separatism in its own territory. But after the victory of pro-European Maia Sandu in the 2020 Moldovan presidential election, Moldova approached the European Union (EU) and worked to reduce its dependence on the Cuciurgan power station,[6] with the power station satisfying 53% of Moldova's electicity needs in November 2024[7] and only 37% in December 2024,[8] well below the historical 70%[5]–90%.[8] Moldova planned to cut itself completely from Transnistrian electricity with the construction of the Vulcănești–Chișinău transmission line,[9] which was to be completed in late 2025[10] and allow Moldova to import sufficient electricity for its needs through Romania, avoiding Transnistria.[11]

Transnistria's economy was entirely dependant on free Russian gas,[1][6][9][12][13] which it used to produce electricity to sell to Moldova, process metal in the Moldova Steel Works in Rîbnița and charge its own population even if at reduced prices,[9] and the termination of this supply of gas had the potential to collapse Transnistria's public budget and risk a humanitarian crisis.[1][6][9][13] Moldova had a contract with Russia's Gazprom on the supply of gas until 30 September 2026.[14] An energy crisis could help Russia destabilize Moldova and bring pro-Russian parties back to power in the parliamentary election in the second half of 2025, making Sandu's pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) lose its majority.[15][16][11] Sandu narrowly won her re-election and a referendum to cement EU accession aspirations in 2024,[15] with both votes having suffered extensive Russian interference including vote buying.[17]

Prelude

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Negotiations with Gazprom and sackings in Moldova

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Dorin Recean, the Prime Minister of Moldova. Recean called for the resignation of three figures considered responsible for the unfolding energy crisis and requested the establishment of a state of emergency in energy.

On 25 November 2024, Moldova's Minister of Energy, Victor Parlicov, met in Saint Petersburg with the CEO of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, to discuss the continuation of gas supplies to Transnistria in the context of the expiration of the deal between Gazprom and Naftogaz on 1 January 2025.[18] Parlicov stated on 27 January that Gazprom had made the continuation of gas supplies, in what quantity and under what conditions, to Moldova conditional on the payment of the debt to the company. Gazprom told Moldova to talk with Ukraine to extend the supply through Ukraine. Parlicov stated "we must really prepare, from now on, for the crisis scenario of 1 January". Gazprom claims Moldova owes it over 700 million dollars, while Moldova argues it owes only 8.6 million dollars based on the results of an external audit presented in September 2023. President of Moldova Maia Sandu and Prime Minister of Moldova Dorin Recean had stated after the publication of the results that Moldova would not pay non-existent debts.[19]

On 5 December, Recean announced that he had requested the resignation of Parlicov, as he was the person responsible for managing the energy sector and "he made mistakes that led us to this situation of crisis". Recean also requested the resignation of two other figures: Victor Bînzari, the general director of Energocom (the national electricity supplier company), as the company "did not manage to secure the gas needs for the winter period at the most advantageous prices"; and Sergiu Tofilat, a member of the supervisory board of Moldovagaz (the national gas supplier company), as he "blocked the procurement of gas by the responsible institutions when the prices were the most affordable". Recean also announced that he would directly assume the role that the energy minister had and that he called for the establishment of a state of emergency in energy starting from 16 December.[20]

On the same day, 26 members of the Parliament of Moldova for the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS), the main opposition party, presented a motion of no confidence against the Recean Cabinet over the energy situation, also calling for early parliamentary elections.[21] Ion Ceban, the Mayor of Chișinău and president of the National Alternative Movement (MAN), called for the resignation of the cabinet and the organisation of early parliamentary elections following Recean's sackings,[22] and so did the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE).[23] The Moldovan parliament rejected the motion on 13 December, with 55 votes against, 18 votes in favor and one abstention, well short of the 55 votes in favor required for a successful motion.[24]

Declarations of states of emergency

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On 11 December, Transnistria's legislature, the Supreme Council, approved a state of economic emergency for a period of 30 days as ordered by the President of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, in the face of the possible end of gas supplies to Transnistria. This measure foresaw the rationalization of gas consumption, the creation of a reserve of energy resources, the end of the export of energy resources with the exception of electricity and the preservation of human life and health.[25]

The Moldovan parliament approved two days later the establishment of a nation-wide state of emergency for a period of 60 days, which would come into effect on 16 December. 56 of the 101 parliament members voted for its approval. Recean added that this was a necessary measure "so that this winter will be the last in which the Kremlin can threaten our energy security" and that "energy blackmail" would end with the completion of the Vulcănești–Chișinău line that was to connect with Romania.[26] Following this, the Romanian energy minister, Sebastian Burduja, announced that Romania would help Moldova overcome the energy crisis and that the Romanian energy companies Nuclearelectrica and Hidroelectrica were already in talks with Energocom to explore options to supply additional electricity to Moldova.[27]

Gazprom's confirmation of the end of gas supplies

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On 17 December, the Moldovan energy ministry announced that Gazprom had not reserved any capacity to transport gas through the Trans-Balkan pipeline for Transnistria for January 2025 when the auctions for the month took place the previous day.[14] On 23 December, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR RF) alleged that Sandu had asked for a plan to take the Cuciurgan power station and Transnistria as a whole by force, that was no guarantee that she would not start a war in the region and that she "is out of her mind".[28]

Gazprom formally notified Moldovagaz on 28 December that gas supplies to Moldova would be completely stopped on 1 January 2025 at 08:00 MSK (07:00 in Moldova, 05:00 UTC). Gazprom cited Moldovagaz's alleged failure to fulfill its payment obligations under the contract as the reason, and it stated that it retained the right to completely terminate the agreement between the two and to demand compensations from Moldovagaz. In response, Recean announced that Moldova would not accept any debt invalidated by the international audit and that Russia was using energy as a political weapon.[29] On the same day, Tiraspoltransgaz, Transnistria's largest gas supplier company, cut off the gas supply to several buildings of the Moldovan authorities in the Security Zone and in the city of Bender (Tighina).[30]

Also on the same day, the opposition Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by former president Igor Dodon, called on the government, which it blamed for the crisis, to try to find solutions regarding the problem of the debt demanded by Gazprom and to re-establish dialogue with Russia to continue the supply of gas and prevent a humanitarian crisis. Recean condemned this call, denied the existence of Gazprom's demanded debt and referred to the Socialists as "political speculators of the Kremlin". Parliament member Radu Marian, of the incumbent PAS, referred to the Socialists' behavior as traitorous for Moldova.[31]

On 30 December, Sandu announced that the Moldovan government and its partners had developed a plan to provide humanitarian aid to the citizens in Transnistria.[32] She later stated that the Transnistrian authorities had rejected help from Moldova.[33] The Moldovan government increased compensation payments for the increase in energy prices for the period between December 2024 and March 2025. Thus, in December, 500 million Moldovan lei would be used to compensate about 670,000 beneficiaries.[34] The Moldovan authorities accused Russia of trying to destabilise the country through energy blackmail in order to influence the 2025 parliamentary election and undermine Moldova's path towards Europe.[32] Recean asked the Minister of Justice, Veronica Mihailov-Moraru, to prepare the legislative changes that would allow for the nationalization of Moldovagaz, of which at that time Gazprom owned half of all shares, Transnistria 13% and the Moldovan government 35.6%.[33]

On 31 December, Bulgaria's energy minister, Vladimir Malinov [pl], declared that Bulgaria would help Moldova by providing the country with access to liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as through the public supplier company Bulgargaz, if Moldova requested it.[35] On the same day, Energocom and Moldovagaz imported a small quantity of gas from Bulgaria via Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine as a test, proving that it was possible to use an alternative route to supply Transnistria with gas as Energocom declared.[36] Furthermore, Moldova's energy ministry announced that Energocom planned to cover 38% of Moldova's electricity needs for January 2025 from local production (over 127,000 megawatt-hours or 28% from the thermal power stations in Chișinău and Bălți, 46,000 MWh or 10% from renewable energy) and that the remaining 62% would be imported from Romania (over 178,000 MWh or 39% from OPCOM [el; ro]'s electricity market, 105,000 MWh or 23% from bilateral contracts).[37]

Crisis

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In Transnistria

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Vadim Krasnoselsky, the President of Transnistria during the energy crisis

On 1 January 2025, at 07:00 EET (05:00 UTC), Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas to Europe through its territory.[38] The supply of gas to Transnistria through Ukraine stopped earlier, on 31 December at 19:50 EET (17:50 UTC).[39] As a result, heating and hot water were cut off in Transnistria.[40] An exception was made for healthcare and residential care facilities.[41] Gas supplies were suspended for the private sector and rural areas, and the use of gas for cooking was permitted until the pressure of the network dropped to a critical level.[42] Transnistrian president Krasnoselsky stated that "we knew about this possibility [the end of the transit of gas], prepared for it and were not caught off guard".[43]

The Cuciurgan power station switched from gas to coal for power generation exactly at midnight on 1 January.[39] Coal reserves would reportedly allow for 50 to 52 days of supply, during which Transnistria was to have guaranteed electricity.[44] However, the Moldovan government's crisis centre reported on 4 January that coal reserves for the power station would only last until the end of January, after which Transnistria would be left without electricity. The Dubăsari Dam would remain operational in such case, but its production capacity was much lower, of 24 megawatts at that moment.[45] Regarding gas reserves, Transnistria's amounted to 13 million cubic metres (460 million cubic feet) as of 1 January, initially reported to be enough for 10 days in the north of the region and 20 days in the south,[42] only to be used for cooking and not for heating.[43] However, it was announced on 8 January that Transnistrian localities were consuming an average of 270,000 m3 (9,500,000 cu ft) of gas per day, so gas reserves would last for 24 days.[46]

According to Transnistria's Minister of Economic Development, Sergey Obolonik [ru], as of 2 January, almost 75,000 households had been disconnected from the supply of gas, while 116,000 would receive a limited amount of gas for the moment. He assured that electricity tariffs would not increase for the Transnistrian population despite the energy crisis.[47] On 6 January, Prime Minister of Transnistria, Aleksandr Rozenberg, stated that 122 settlements were completely cut off from the gas supply, including 51,507 rural households, over 20,000 urban households and 1,800 legal entities and entrepreneurs.[48] Furthermore, on 4 January, one of Tiraspol's districts was left without water. The next day, the Transnistrian authorities warned that the upper floors in high-rise buildings in Tiraspol and Bender could be left without water as a result of a drop in pressure in the network during the power cuts,[49] and several settlements in Slobozia District were cut off from water.[48]

On 1 January, production facilities and hundreds of businesses put their operations on hold,[43] leaving thousands of people unemployed.[50] The next day, Obolonik stated that all industrial enterprises in Transnistria had stopped their activities, with the exception of those necessary to maintain food security in the breakaway state. He warned of "irreversible changes" as "enterprises will lose the ability to start up" if the gas problem was not resolved soon.[51] On 4 January, the Rîbnița steel plant's director Serghei Kornev stated that the plant had ceased operations and could not be reactivated in the near future, leaving over 2,000 workers unemployed and creating risks for the Transnistrian economy.[52] On 10 January, Transnistria's state of economic emergency was extended until 8 February, including that day.[53] On 13 January, Rozenberg stated that Transnistria was in "very difficult, almost critical conditions"; among other things, he mentioned that Transnistria's imports had fallen by 43% (7 million dollars) and exports by 60% (3.3 million dollars)[54] in the first ten days of 2025.[55]

Power cuts were first introduced on 3 January, lasting one hour, to be rotated between groups of different regions of the republic at distinct hours, as the energy system would not be producing enough electricity to meet the population's consumption level.[56] They were extended to three hours on 4 January and to four hours on 5 January.[57] Constantin Borosan, secretary of state of Moldova's energy ministry, reported on 5 January that the power deficit in Transnistria had reached around 30% of consumption, about 65 MW, as people were using electric heaters following the stop of gas supplies to rural areas and businesses and of heating and hot water to cities.[58] According to him, the 30% power deficit could provoke a complete collapse of the region's power system.[59] The power cuts in Transnistria were extended yet again on 7 January to eight hours, two separate cuts of four hours each.[60] On 10 January, the power cuts were reduced to a single rotative cut of five hours. This was made possible, among other things, because a third power generation facility, the Tirotex-Energo power station, was put into operation, to produce 10–15 kilowatt-hour.[61] The power cuts were reduced to three hours on 12 January and back to five the next day.[62]

On 24 January, several hundred people[63] demonstrated in Transnistria at checkpoints on the line of contact with Moldova in Bender, Dubăsari and Rîbnița against a supposed blockage of gas supplies to Transnistria by Moldova. Protestors carried Russian and Transnistrian flags and banners with messages such as "Moldova, let the gas in!", and Krasnoselsky and former Transnistrian president Igor Smirnov were present at the protests. Moldovan government spokesman Daniel Vodă stated that "we know from the experience of other protests in the region that they are coordinated by the so-called authorities directed by Moscow".[64]

In the rest of Moldova

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Electricity supplies to Moldova from the Cuciurgan power station stopped completely on 1 January. Moldova's Termoelectrica company put the CET-1 power station [ro; ru; uk] in operation that day. It produced 6 MW, while the CET-2 power station [ro; ru; uk] produced 174–175 MW.[42] Throughout the energy crisis, the CET-Nord power station [ro; ru; uk] and the Stânca–Costești Hydroelectric Station [ro; ru] also helped Moldova produce electricity.[65]

According to Energocom, the deficit of the electricity system in government-held Moldova was about 600 MW as of 1 January, to be covered not only from the Romanian electricity market and bilateral contracts, but also from Ukraine's Energoatom state-owned energy company.[66] Electricity imported from Romania arrived via the Isaccea–Vulcănești line.[42] The volume of gas exports from Romania to Moldova, carried out primarily through the Iași–Chișinău pipeline, reached a record level of 5 million m3 (180 million cu ft) of gas on 3 January[67] and of 5.6 million m3 (200 million cu ft) on 17 January, close to the maximum capacity of the pipeline. The supply of electricity also reached on the latter day one of the highest levels since the beginning of the crisis, 660 MW, covering 75% of Moldova's consumption of 886 MW for that day.[68] Romanian energy minister Burduja had declared on 2 January "I consider that we have a moral duty to stand by our brothers across the Prut with everything possible".[69] On 4 January, Borosan announced that Moldova was registering an energy consumption level lower than expected due to the population's receptivity of the authorities' calls to save energy.[70]

On 3 January, Moldova's National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) increased electricity tariffs for Premier Energy consumers in the centre and south of the country by 75% (from 2.34 to 4.10 lei per kWh) and for FEE-Nord consumers in the north by 65% (from 2.84 to 4.68 lei per kWh). Heating tariffs were also increased by 38% in Chișinău, 17% in Bălți and 12% in Comrat. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection announced it would compensate the increase in energy tariffs to those who had already submitted compensation requests.[71] The next day, Alexandr Petkov, the Mayor of Bălți, called on the Moldovan government to compensate for the damages caused to Bălți by its "incompetent policies" regarding energy security in the face of increased electricity and heating tariffs.[72]

The villages of Copanca and Varnița were also affected by the power cuts in Transnistria, as they were connected to the Transnistrian energy system.[73] All Moldovan-held villages connected to the Transnistrian energy system, more than a dozen in the districts of Anenii Noi, Căușeni and Dubăsari, were disconnected on 6 January.[74] Works to reconnect these villages to the right bank of the Dniester's gas supply system would be a lengthy process, making it likely that these villages would remain without gas for the winter.[75] Dozens of people protested in Copanca on 17 January against changing the connection of the village and paying higher tariffs,[76] with residents blocking works to install transmission towers. The Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Oleg Serebrian, declared that Moldova's "enemies" were attempting to attack stability and hinder Chișinău's help to the region's inhabitants, asking Copanca inhabitants "don't let yourselves be used" and "don't be seduced by promises of cheap gas and free electricity".[77]

Moldovan foreign policy presidential adviser Olga Roșca declared to the BBC on 1 January that "we're treating this not as an energy crisis but a security crisis", which would have been instigated by Russia to destabilize the country socially and economically and "create demand for a return of pro-Russian forces to power" ahead of the 2025 parliamentary election in Moldova.[12] Recean later described the end of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria as a security crisis for Moldova with the aim of allowing a pro-Russian victory in the upcoming parliamentary election and "transforming our territory into a weapon against Ukraine", adding that Russia had "betrayed" and "isolated" Transnistria.[78]

Rejection of help by Transnistria and blaming accussations

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On 2 January, Moldovagaz and Energocom offered Tiraspoltransgaz assistance, including technical and commercial support, to organise the purchase of gas from any European gas platform at market price.[50] Tiraspoltransgaz rejected this offer, with the Transnistrian authorities stating that this would entail buying gas at a higher price and that a resumption of gas supplies by Gazprom was expected in virtue of the contract expiring in 2026.[79] A Moldovan government source declared to the American digital newspaper Politico that they believed this decision came from Russia rather than from the Transnistrian authorities.[80] The next day, the Moldovan government announced it had alternative energy sources (biomass systems, generators), humanitarian aid and essential medical supplies ready to be sent to Transnistria if the separatist authorities accepted the help.[78] This offer was also rejected.[80] Borosan stated on 5 January that apart from Moldovagaz's and Energocom's offer to Tiraspoltransgaz, the Moldovan government already proposed back in December that Tiraspoltransgaz considered buying gas from the Romanian market as well as that Energocom purchased gas so that the Cuciurgan power station could continue to produce electricity; no response was received to either proposal.[58]

Krasnoselsky said on 6 January that it was a lie that Transnistria had rejected help from Moldova, that no offers had been received from it or any other country and that Moldova's goal was to "strangle" Transnistria;[81] Moldova's reintegration bureau reiterated that Transnistria rejected Moldovan offers of help in response.[82] Furthermore, the Russian embassy in Chișinău [ro; ru] stated that Transnistria's situation had been created by the West and Ukraine, that some Moldovan "hot-heads" were proposing to resolve the conflict by force and that these actions "will not go unanswered".[83] Moldova's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian ambassador Oleg Ozerov [ru] as a result and called the embassy's statements "a cynical attempt to manipulate public opinion" and blame Moldova and Ukraine, when responsibility for the crisis would fall only on Russia.[84] After the Russian embassy's declarations, the reintegration bureau stated that "we have every reason to believe that a scenario of destabilization of the situation in the country is being followed",[85] while Recean reiterated that Moldova sought a peaceful reintegration of the country, to commence with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria.[86]

Sandu stated on 9 January that she had discussed with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the possibility of Ukraine supplying coal for the Cuciurgan power station to produce electricity, and that Transnistria in return could provide electricity to Ukraine.[87] On 23 January, Krasnoselsky said that the coal offered by Ukraine was not suitable for the power station, as it was gaseous coal rather than anthracite.[88] Zelensky stated on 25 January that Ukraine could send a team of specialists to the power plant to adapt it to a different type of coal,[89] which Krasnoselsky rejected as a "speculative option" on 27 January, declaring that it would require a high amount of time and money.[90]

On 16 January, it was announced that Transnistria had rejected Moldova's proposal for a meeting between political representatives that was to be held the next day to discuss the provision of humanitarian assistance to Transnistria, the creation of a group to manage the crisis and Transnistria's response to Ukraine's proposal to supply coal for the Cuciurgan power plant.[91] As a result, the next day, Serebrian accused Transnistria of having a "genocidal attitude" towards the civilians on the left bank of the Dniester, "whom they are holding captive"; and appealed "if you do not want to ask us for help, at least let us help you", asking that Moldovan medical assistance and generators, as well as Ukrainian coal, be accepted.[92]

On 21 January, the Moldovan energy ministry announced that Gazprom had not again reserved gas transportation capacity in the Trans-Balkan pipeline for the month of February following the auctions for the month the day before.[93]

Humanitarian situation

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After the end of the Russian gas supplies to Transnistria, the energy company Tirasteploenergo urged Transnistrian residents to dress warmly, gather family members together in a single room, hang blankets or thick curtains over windows and balcony doors and use electric heaters, stating that it was forbidden to use gas or electric stoves to heat the apartment, as "this can lead to tragedy".[40] Three dozen heating and temporary accommodation points were equipped across Transnistria, ready to accommodate 1,325 people.[39] The temperature in Tiraspol was set to drop to 1 °C (34 °F) on the night of 1 January.[41]

The day of the end of the supplies, 131 schools, 147 kindergartens and 130 administrative buildings in Transnistria were disconnected from heating.[39] 40 kindergartens were kept heated, which would accommodate children whose parents were involved in mitigating the energy crisis. Transnistrian schools were mandated to switch to distance learning, similar to during the COVID-19 pandemic, after the New Year holidays.[43] The holidays were later extended, pupils would return to class on 20 January.[94]

On 5 January, Transnistria's Ministry of Health stated that, the previous day, over 500 people presented to outpatient centres in Tiraspol and Bender with fever, of whom a dozen were hospitalised. Isolated cases of hypothermia were also reported.[95] On 6 January, Promo-LEX lawyer Vadim Vieru told Radio Moldova that over 4,000 prisoners in Transnistrian prisons were now without heating, further worsening conditions of detention.[96]

Transnistria's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on 5 January that a retired couple had died in Cioborciu from carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning after leaving a stove on and going to sleep. Since the beginning of the year, other two people in Dubăsari, one in Grigoriopol and one in Caragaș had suffered CO poisoning as the ministry reported.[97] Other four people were poisoned in Bender on 7 January, and a woman in Tiraspol died from CO poisoning on 8 January after using a gas water heater to shower without having a chimney.[98] It was reported on 11 January that five more people had been poisoned in the past 24 hours, bringing the total number to 16, including the three deaths.[99] This number had risen to 20 by 18 January.[100]

Analysis

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Potential humanitarian crisis in Transnistria

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According to Serebrian, the energy crisis caused by the end of Russian gas exports to Transnistria could cause a "much more complicated" situation than that caused by the 2022–2023 Moldovan energy crisis. As he stated, Transnistria's population could face a humanitarian crisis, as it could be left without gas, coal, and electricity.[101] On his part, Recean stated that Transnistrians could remain without heat and electricity, which could turn into a humanitarian catastrophe. Some 300,000 people lived in Transnistria at the time according to him;[102] over 90% of them had Moldovan citizenship according to Serebrian.[103]

Ukrainian journalist Serhii Sydorenko argued in an article for European Pravda that the end of free Russian gas supplies to Transnistria would cause the disappearance of most of Transnistria's revenues and the collapse of its public budget. This would jeopardize the continuation of below-the-market prices for gas, electricity and heating for the Transnistrian population. The strong reduction of revenue and the new costs that would appear as a result of the energy crisis would not allow it to be mitigated through austerity measures. Furthermore, a shortage of energy resources would aggravate the humanitarian crisis; problems with fuel needed for heating could generate a severe social and economic disaster in the region according to Sydorenko. One of the first consequences of this, he argued, could be a rapid outflow of people, especially young and working-age people, from Transnistria, further exacerbating the region's administrative and budgetary crisis. He considered the prospect of Transnistria closing its "borders" to stop this outflow impossible.[1]

Geopolitical implications

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Main article: Reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova

According to Sydorenko, the humanitarian crisis that could arise from the end of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria would lead to a rapid collapse of the separatist regime. Transnistria would be forced to negotiate a reintegration back into Moldova, which could happen quickly if the Moldovan authorities showed flexibility.[1] Parlicov expressed similar hopes; in a TV8 programme on 27 November 2024, he stated that the region could be reintegrated by 2026 if Moldova established a good interaction with the Transnistrian authorities.[104]

Sydorenko argued that Moldova would not lack financial and expert assistance from Western partners to tackle the crisis. For the West, the costs would be moderate given the region's small size and population. Furthermore, the West could regard this project as a chance to generate a model of reintegration for the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine. Ukraine's case in particular would pose significantly larger and more complex problems than Transnistria's reintegration, and the West could be interested in using Transnistria as a "testing ground" for its approaches and theories before treating Ukraine's more complex case.[1]

In an article for the Harvard International Review, Lizzie Place noted that the Moldovan government could theoretically cut off all energy payments to Transnistria to put pressure on the region to reintegrate. However, the economic collapse and humanitarian crisis this would pose for its own citizens would make it hesitant to implement such a scenario, she considered. Moldovan scholar Ion Marandici regarded a gradual decrease in energy payments to Transnistria coupled with humanitarian assistance for residents as a more realistic scenario for reintegration.[2]

Russian disinformation

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See also: Russian disinformation

In the face of the possible crisis in Transnistria, Russian propagandists and influence agents stepped up accusations against Moldova's leadership. These accusations included narratives that Sandu had ordered and prepared a military takeover of Transnistria, that she had refused to discuss with Ukraine the continuation of the transit of gas, that Moldova would take "revenge" on Transnistria if Russia refused to continue supplying gas to Moldova and that the EU would be passive or even tacitly supportive of a new crisis in Russia's sphere of influence.[105]

Following the SVR RF's 23 December 2024 intelligence report, Russian state-owned news agency TASS stated on Telegram that the EU did not know how to calm "emotionally unstable" Sandu, who was preparing a military intervention into Transnistria. Russian state-owned news agencies RT and RIA Novosti also shared on Telegram the information in the SVR RF's report; as of 25 December, TASS' publication garnered nearly 62,000 views on the platform, RT's gained over 222,000 and RIA Novosti's gained over 633,000. Moldovan fugitive oligarch and politician Ilan Shor made use of the SVR RF's report, stating that he had already warned multiple times that Moldova was getting into the same "scheme" that had been "implemented" in Ukraine, that "Sandu will flee, and ordinary people will suffer" and that "we have to stop her before it is too late". For his part, Russian State Duma member Aleksey Zhuravlyov declared that Sandu was "emotionally unstable", "completely incapable of negotiating", "incapable of independent thought" and that she "only follows the orders of her Western puppeteers", threatening that Russia would defend Transnistria from a Moldovan attack, for which both should be prepared.[105]

The report, the news agencies' publications and Shor's post were reposted by dozens of pro-Russian Telegram channels, gaining tens of thousands of views. These included Молдавский Vагон (Moldavskiy Vagon, "Moldovan Wagon"), belonging to Moldovan politologist and PSRM parliament member Bogdan Țîrdea [ro; ru]; he later also published the Moldovan authorities' denial of the accusations. Russian Telegram channel Политджойстик / Politjoystic threatened "Does Sandu want us to launch missile strikes against decision-making centres in Moldova?", and stated that "military diplomacy" was more convincing than peaceful diplomacy; the post gained 48,000 views as of 25 December. 154,000 views were gained as of the same day by a post of the channel Lomovka, which accused Sandu of "taking the gas from the people" and wanting to form a military coalition with Western support to "capture" Transnistria. Гражданин (Grazhdanin, "Citizen") alleged that Romania would help Sandu attack Transnistria, while Военная хроника (Voyennaya khronika, "War Chronicle") reported that an attack on Transnistria could seek to disrupt or delay peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia and accuse Russia of a new aggression. Russian analyst Yuri Baranchik declared in his Telegram channel that it would be necessary to take Mykolaiv and Odesa from Ukraine to form a land corridor with Transnistria and "restore justice and legality" in Transnistria and Moldova, and that an attack against Transnistria guaranteed a Russian invasion and "deprivation of the statehood" of Moldova.[105]

Adrian Băluțel, the chief of staff of Sandu's presidency, denied accusations that Moldova was preparing an attack against Transnistria, calling them a dangerous hoax meant to spread panic.[105] According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the accusations could represent an attempt to set the ground for a Russian false flag operation in Transnistria. They could also have been aimed at disrupting Moldova's accession to the EU by destabilising it, the ISW stated.[106] Moldovan analyst Andrei Curăraru stated that the accusations were part of a destabilization plan and that they could be preceding several possible scenarios: an incident fabricated by Russia at the Cuciurgan power station to justify an intervention in Transnistria; extra accusations blaming Moldova of sabotaging Transnistria's energy to cause further hostility between the two and divert attention from Russia's failures; and an intensification of anti-Moldovan propaganda to radicalize the Transnistrian population and hinder any dialogue process.[105]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
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