Assadism
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Assadism is a far-left[1] neo-Ba'athist ideology based on the policies and thinking of the Assad family, which governed Syria as a totalitarian hereditary dictatorship from 1971 to 2024. This period spanned the successive regimes of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad. The Assads rose to power as a result of the 1970 Syrian coup d'état, leading to the consolidation of Alawite minority dominance within the military and security forces. Their governance was largely characterized by nepotism, sectarianism, and ethnic favoritism.[2] The ideology enshrines the Assad family's leadership role in Syrian politics and presented the Assad regime in a very personalist fashion, creating a government based upon and revolving around its leader. Under this system, the Syrian Ba'ath Party portrayed the wisdom of Assad as "beyond the comprehension of the average citizen."[3] Syrian state propaganda cast Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[4]
The Assad family cultivated extensive patronage networks, securing loyalty while monopolizing vast portions of the Syrian economy and fostering widespread corruption.[5] The Syrian Ba'ath party used its control over Syria's political, social, economic, cultural, educational and religious spheres to enforce its neo-Ba'athist ideology in the wider society and preserve the Assad family's grip on power. Hafez al-Assad's goal upon coming to power was to consolidate the socialist state with the Ba'ath party as its vanguard by establishing a "coup-proof" system that eliminated factional rivalries. As soon as he seized power, the armed forces, secret police, security forces, and bureaucracy were purged, subjugating them to party command by installing Alawite elites loyal to Assad.[6][7] To maintain control, although Assadism initially attempted to solve problems within the country through political maneuvering in 1970s, by the early 1980s the regime had shifted toward the use of brute force and relentless oppression, exemplified by the Hama massacre in 1982 and the several sectarian massacres over the course of the Syrian civil war since 2011.[8] Following the fall of the Assad regime in 2024 due to a renewed Syrian opposition offensive amid the civil war, Assadists loyal to the former regime have engaged in a violent insurgency across Alawite strongholds in western Syria.[9]
Jamal al-Atassi, co-founder of Zaki al-Arsuzi's early Arab Ba'ath Party and later Syrian dissident, stated that "Assadism is a false nationalism. It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and the mukhabarat... And despite its socialist slogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—a nouvelle bourgeoisie parasitaire."[10] The Assad family aligned itself with Iran and its Axis of Resistance for much of its rule, contributing to an inter-Ba'athist rivalry with the Sunni-dominated Saddamist Ba'ath Party in Iraq.[11]
History
[edit]Pre-1970
[edit]Prior to Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in 1970, the neo-Ba'athist movement in Syria had been dominated by strongman Salah Jadid, who came to power after a successful coup in 1966. Tensions between Jadid and Assad increased following the Six-Day War in 1967 and invasion of Jordan in 1970. Hafez al-Assad took advantage of his control over the military to dismantle Jadid's support network, before carrying out a coup and imprisoning Jadid and then Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi.[12]
After 1970
[edit]After Assad seized power, the ideology of neo-Ba'athism transformed into Assadism, with even greater nationalism, militarism and the now established cult of personality of the Assad family.
Hafez al-Assad's reign was marked by the virtual abandonment of Pan-Arab ideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructing socialist society within Syria.[13] Political participation was limited to the National Progressive Front, the ruling coalition of Syrian Baath and Marxist–Leninist parties; entrenching itself firmly within the Soviet Bloc. The Party also began building a personality cult around Assad and brought the elite of the armed forces under Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed with Alawite loyalists, further alienating the Sunni majority from the party.[14]
The Ba'athists initially pursued a very militaristic policy aimed at some kind of "mobilization of the nation to fight against the Israeli enemy." But under Assad, militarism reached new heights. Following the Syrian loss during the Six-Day War with Israel, Hafez initiated a huge expansion of the military to achieve military parity with Israel. Assad gave a high priority to building a strong military and preparing it for a confrontation with Israel, both for offensive and defensive purposes and to enable him to politically negotiate the return of the Golan Heights from a position of military strength. He allocated up to 70 percent of the annual budget to the military build-up and received large quantities of modern arms from the Soviet Union.[15] The Syrian Arab Army, which was mainly a conscripted force, increased from 50,000 personnel in 1967 to 225,000 in 1973, and to over 350,000 by the 1990s.
The degree of militarization of Ba'athist Syria was indecently high. Syria's air force and tank fleets were not much smaller (if not larger) than those of large European countries. In 1979, Syria was one of the four largest arms importers in the world (between 1961 and 1979, it imported weapons worth $7.4 billion, one of the highest figures).[16]
Bitterness towards the Assadist regime and the Alawite elite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of an Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders of Muslim Brotherhood like Issam al-Attar were imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunni ulema, Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries and Islamist activists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad through Jihad and establishing an Islamic state. In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in its war with Iraq and controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups into Lebanon and Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledged Islamist rebellion in 1982; led by the Islamic Front. The regime responded by slaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hama and Aleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and the Muslim Brotherhood armed movement was demolished.[17]
References
[edit]- ^
- Cavoški, Jovan (2022). Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History. UK: Bloomsburry. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-3500-3209-5.
Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
- I. Dawisha, Adeed (1980). "3: External and Internal Setting". Syria and the Lebanese Crisis. London, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 45. ISBN 978-1-349-05373-5.
The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
- The Israel Economist. Vol. 26–27. University of Minnesota: Kollek & Son, Limited. 1970. p. 61.
The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
- Abadi, Jacob (2004). Israel's Quest for Recognition and Acceptance in Asia: Garrison State Diplomacy. London, UK: Frank Class Publishers. p. 22. ISBN 0-7146-5576-7.
radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
- S. Abu Jaber, Kamel (1966). The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization. Syracuse, New York, USA: Syracuse University Press. pp. xii–xiii, 33–47, 75–97. LCCN 66-25181.
The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
- Hopwood, Derek (2013). Syria 1945–1986: Politics and Society. Routledge. pp. 45–46, 73–75, 90. doi:10.4324/9781315818955. ISBN 9781317818427.
The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis ... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
- Phillips, Christopher (2020). The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East. London, UK: Yale University Press. p. 11. ISBN 978-0-300-21717-9.
In 1963 ... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
- Mikhaĭlovich Vasil'ev, Alekseĭ (1993). Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism. University of Michigan, USA: Ithaca Press. pp. 63, 76. ISBN 978-0863721687.
Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy ... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union ... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
- Climent, James (2015). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. p. 383. ISBN 978-0-7656-8284-0.
influence of different views, came from the more radical left-wing nationalist groups. These groups included ... Syria's Ba'ath party which seized power in Damascus in 1963
- Cavoški, Jovan (2022). Non-Aligned Movement Summits: A History. UK: Bloomsburry. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-3500-3209-5.
- ^ Korany, Bahgat; Dessouki, Ali (2010-07-15), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, American University in Cairo Press, pp. 423–424, ISBN 978-977-416-360-9
- ^ Kheir, Karen Abul (2010). Korany, Bahgat; Hilāl, ʻAlī al-Dīn (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab states: The Challenge of Globalization. An AUC Forum for International Affairs edition. The American University in Cairo Press. p. 423. ISBN 978-977-416-360-9.
- ^ Dam, Nikolaos van (2011). 10: Conclusions: The struggle for power in Syria: politics and society under Asad and the Ba'th Party (4 ed.). London: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84885-760-5.
- ^ M. Sadowski, Yahya (1987). "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria". Arab Studies Quarterly. 9 (4): 442–461. JSTOR 41857946.
- ^ Marczak, Shields, Nikki, Kirril; J. Bellamy, McLoghlin, Alex, Stephen (2020). "1. Fateful Choices: Political Leadership and the Paths to and from Mass Atrocities". Genocide Perspectives VI: The Process and the Personal Cost of Genocide. University of Technology, Sydney, Australia: UTS ePRESS. pp. 15–17. ISBN 978-0-9775200-3-9.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Batatu, Hanna (1999). Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Princeton University Press. pp. 254, 326–327. ISBN 0-691-00254-1.
- ^ MacFarquhar, Neil (2024-12-08). "The Assad Family's Legacy Is One of Savage Oppression". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-03-09.
- ^ "Syria's new rulers launch crackdown in Assad stronghold after deadly clashes". 26 December 2024.
- ^ Viorst, Milton (1995). Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern World. Syracuse University Press. p. 146. ISBN 978-0224033237.
- ^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival (Norton), 2006, p.154
- ^ Federal Research Division (2004). Syria: A Country Study. Kessinger Publishing. p. 213. ISBN 978-1-4191-5022-7.
- ^ Pipes, Daniel (1996). Syria Beyond the Peace Process. Daniel Pipes. p. 5. ISBN 978-0-944029-64-0.
- ^ Roberts, David (2015). The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 53, 106–108. ISBN 978-0-415-83882-5.
- ^ Reich, Bernard (1990). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-313-26213-5.
- ^ Ufheil-Somers, Amanda (1982-11-03). "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles". MERIP. Retrieved 2025-02-13.
- ^ Roberts, David (2015). "12: Hafiz al-Asad - II". The Ba'ath and the creation of modern Syria (Routledge Library Editions: Syria ed.). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 114–117, 119–121. ISBN 978-0-415-83882-5.