2000 Charles de Gaulle Airport runway collision

2000 Charles de Gaulle Airport runway collision
Air Liberté Flight 8807 · Streamline Aviation Flight 200

Accident
Date	25 May 2000
Summary	Runway incursion due to ATC error
Site	Charles de Gaulle Airport, France
Total fatalities	1
Total injuries	1
First aircraft
The McDonnell Douglas MD-83 involved in the accident, while operating for Air Liberté Tunisie
Type	McDonnell Douglas MD-83
Operator	Air Liberté
IATA flight No.	IJ8077
ICAO flight No.	LIB8807
Call sign	LIBERTE 8807
Registration	F‑GHED
Flight origin	Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris, France
Destination	Barajas Airport, Madrid, Spain
Occupants	157
Passengers	151
Crew	6
Fatalities	0
Injuries	0
Survivors	157
Second aircraft
The Shorts 330-200 involved in the accident with a previous operator & registration
Type	Shorts 330‑200
Operator	Streamline Aviation
ICAO flight No.	SSW200
Call sign	STREAMLINE 200
Registration	G‑SSWN
Flight origin	Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris, France
Destination	Luton Airport, London, United Kingdom
Passengers	0
Crew	2
Fatalities	1
Injuries	1
Survivors	1

On 25 May 2000, Air Liberté Flight 8807, a passenger charter flight operated by a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 (F‑GHED), collided with a Shorts 330‑200 freighter (G‑SSWN) operating as Streamline Aviation Flight 200 at Paris–Charles de Gaulle Airport during a runway incursion; the first officer of Flight 200 was killed and the captain was seriously injured, while on board Flight 8807 there were no injuries. The accident was blamed on the air traffic controller mistakenly thinking that Flight 200 was behind Flight 8807 when it was on the runway.

Background

Aircraft

Flight 8807

The aircraft operating as Flight 8807 was a McDonnell Douglas MD‑83 (registration F‑GHED) and was operated by Air Liberté. It had 27,957 total airframe hours.

Flight 200

The aircraft that was operating as Flight 200 was a Shorts 330-200 registered as G-SSWN. It was manufactured in 1981 with the MSN of SH.3064 and had 15,215 total airframe hours.

Crew

Flight 8807

The captain, aged 55, had a total of 11,418 flight hours and approximately 3 years of experience on the MD‑83. The first officer, aged 47, had logged 11,104 flight hours and had been flying the MD‑83 for about 9 months.

Flight 200

The captain was Gary Grant, aged 41, who had accumulated 2,440 total flight hours, including 1,005 on the Shorts 330. The first officer was John Andrews, aged 43, who had logged 4,370 flight hours, but had only 14 hours of experience on type.

Accident

Streamline Aviation Flight 200 was cleared to "line up and wait, number two" from taxiway 16. However, the tower controller mistakenly believed the aircraft was positioned behind the MD‑83 operating as Air Liberté Flight 8807, when in reality, Flight 200 was entering the runway from taxiway 16. Flight 8807 was then cleared for takeoff and began its roll. Flight 200 made visual with Flight 8807 via their beacon lights, and immediately tried to brake. At approximately 155 knots, the MD‑83's left wing impacted the cockpit of the Shorts 330. The first officer on Flight 200 was killed instantly in the accident, while the captain sustained serious injuries. The MD‑83 aborted the takeoff safely.

The collision occurred at night under complex traffic conditions, including intersection departures, a high ATC workload, and limited visibility due to lighting conditions.

Investigation

The French BEA concluded that the accident was caused by a mental model error by ATC—believing the Shorts was behind the MD-83, when in reality, it was in front of the MD-83. Other factors included miscommunication between ground and tower controllers, confusing bilingual radio traffic, poor visibility, and the Shorts crew not confirming their position.

The probable cause of the accident is as follows:

The LOC controller's erroneous perception of the position of the aircraft, this being reinforced by the context and the working methods, which led him to clear the Shorts to line up, the inadequacy of systematic verification procedures in ATC which made it impossible for the error to be corrected, and the Shorts' crew not dispelling any doubts they had as to the position of the 'number one' aircraft before entering the runway.

The contributing factors were written to be:

• Light pollution in the area of runway 27, which made a direct view difficult for the LOC controller.
• Difficulty for the LOC controller in accessing radar information: the ASTRE image was difficult to read and the AVISO image not displayed at his control position.
• The use of two languages for radio communications, which meant that the Shorts crew were not conscious that the MD 83 was going to take off.
• The angle between access taxiway 16 and the runway which made it impossible for the Shorts crew to perform a visual check before entering the runway.
• The lack of co-ordination between the SOL and LOC controllers when managing the Shorts, exacerbated by the presence of a third party whose role was not defined.
• A feedback system which was recent and still underdeveloped.

Aftermath

The MD-83 was repaired and returned to service. The Shorts 330 was written off. In response to the accident, BEA issued recommendations for mandatory English-only ATC at CDG, improved communication protocols, and stricter runway entry verification.